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THE MDP CHALLENGE IN THE
CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION
Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silvert
INTRODUCTION
One way of telling a story of MDPs-multi-disciplinary prac-
tices including legal services-and globalization would be to assert
that what happens in the United States is essentially irrelevant. More
permissive regulatory structures outside the U.S. will permit the Big
Five accounting firms to acquire or build law practices under their
control. Clients who value those services and the economies that
come with "one-stop shopping" will hire the MDPs wherever they
technically have their bases of operations. The obvious parallel
would be the way that tightly regulated banks, Citibank in particular,
took advantage of liberal regimes outside the U.S. to shatter the
boundaries that had kept commercial banks from, for example, selling
insurance, engaging in investment banking, and marketing securities. -
Eventually the domestic regulations collapsed. The U.S. ratified the
t Bryant G. Garth is the Director of the American Bar Foundation. Carole Silver is
Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of the Law and Social Science Program at Northwestern
University School of Law.
1 Multi-disciplinary practice is permitted to varying degrees in Germany, France, Eng-
land (for solicitors), and Australia, among other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act,
1987 § 48G (N.S.W. CONSOL. ACTS, Austl.) (authorizing barristers and solicitors to form part-
nerships with persons who are not barristers or solicitors), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au
(last visited Feb. 18, 2002) (on file with CWRU Law Review). See also DIRECTOR GENERAL,
OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, PUB. No. OFT328, COMPETITION IN THE
PROFESSIONS (2001), (observing that consumers are best served by unrestricted competition),
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 14, 2002) (on file with CWRU Law Re-
view). For a thorough discussion of national MDP regulations, see Mary C. Daly, Choosing
Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a
Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 (1999) (discussing the delivery of
legal services outside the United States by the Big Five accounting firms); John S. Dzienkowski
& Robert J. Peroni, A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the
Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (2000); Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs:
Should the No Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 869 (1999) (discussing the global
response to multidisciplinary practice regulation).
2 See PHILLIP L. ZWEIG, WRISTON: WALTER WRISTON, CITIBANK, AND THE RISE AND
FALL OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL SUPREMACY 1-3 (1995).
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changes and abolished the regulatory regime that had been in place
since the Depression.3
Proponents of MDPs make a similar argument that deregulation
is inevitable,4 but the argument is largely promotional. Such a result is
not inevitable and, in fact, what happens in the U.S. legal profession
is far more important than what happens elsewhere. The U.S. corpo-
rate law firm is probably the most successful legal export we have-
both in the amount of revenue that corporate lawyers generate for the
U.S. and in the large and growing number of imitators found around
the world.5 Law is domestic by definition, which has meant that truly
global law firms have been very difficult to assemble. At the present
time, however, U.S. law (and to a lesser extent English law) and legal
approaches are essential materials for international business transac-
tions. American concepts are the basis for drafting contracts and for
contract enforcement mechanisms, including arbitration and alterna-
tive dispute resolution, as well as the approaches to the regulation of
securities, the environment, trade, and antitrust. Even international
human rights law, also with a major U.S. component, has become a
central concern for both states and international businesses. It is now
difficult to be a successful corporate lawyer anywhere without a facil-
ity in U.S. law and legal approaches.6 This new landscape provides
huge opportunities for global U.S. law firms and their counterparts
based in the U.K. It is hard to see any imminent threat to the global
power of these firms and their methods of doing business.
3 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
4 See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 89 (stating that the U.S. legal profes-
sion must accommodate multidisciplinary practice); Ann L. MacNaughton & Gary A. Mun-
neke, Practicing Law Across Geographic and Professional Borders: What Does the Future
Hold?, 47 Loy. L. REv. 665, 708 (2001) (observing "the time is at hand" to regulate multidis-
ciplinary practice); Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the
Anti-Interference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1469, 1527 (2000) (discussing
how the Bar should react as multidisciplinary practices become more lawful). The following
statements offered to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice are among those
indicating views of the inevitability of MDPs: Lawrence M. Hill, Oral Testimony to ABA Com-
mission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/lhilll.htm
(on file with CWRU Law Review); Samuel B. Sterrett, Statement to ABA Commission on Mul-
tidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999), at http://www.abanet.orgtcpr/sterrettl.html (on file with
CWRU Law Review); Bernard Wolfram, Remarks to the ABA Commission on Multidiscipli-
nary Practice (Mar. 12, 1999), at http://www.abanet.orgtcpr/wolfmanl.html (on file with
CWRU Law Review).
5 See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Big Five Versus Big Law: Confrontational
Rhetoric in the Service of Legitimating Shifting Relationships Between Business and Law, in
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW 513 (Jens Drolhammer & Michael
Pfeifer eds., 2001) (discussing the entry of the Big Five accounting firms into the market for
corporate legal services).
6 See Carole Silver, The Case of the Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing the U.S. Legal
Profession, FORDHAM INT'L J. L. (forthcoming).
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From this perspective, the battle fought in the United States over
the MDP--especially in the American Bar Association ("ABA") and
in New York-assumes major importance. It is understandable why
leaders of the more conservative bar associations from around the
world came to the U.S. and sought to influence the ABA debates.7
They recognized that the outcome of debates about regulation in the
U.S. would be more important than events in the rest of the world.
The outcome so far in the U.S. is also quite convincing. It is clear that
the Big Five will not be able to muster a real challenge to the tradi-
tional corporate law firms, especially the more elite ones, without a
strong organizational base in the United States, particularly in New
York and Washington, D.C. So far there are no signs that such a base
will be permitted or, if permitted, that the Big Five could compete at a
high level.'
On the other hand, our perspective, which is based on prelimi-
nary research as part of a continuing project, suggests that the debate
7 See, e.g., Dan Brennan QC, Chairman, General Council of the Bar of England and
Wales, Testimony before the American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice (Aug. 8, 1999), at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/brennan.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2002) (on
file with CWRU Law Review); Ram6n M. Mullerat, Former President, Council of the Bars and
Law Societies of the European Community (June 1999), at http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/ mul-
lerat2.html (last visited Feb, 14, 2002) (on file with CWRU Law Review). Testimony presented
to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice is collected at
http:llwww.abanet.orglcprlmulticom.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2002) (on file with CWRU Law
Review).
8 New York adopted new rules governing the relationship between lawyers and non-
lawyers effective November 2001. These rules prohibit noniawyers from holding or exercising
"any ownership or investment interest in, or managerial or supervisory right, power or position
in connection with the practice of law by the lawyer or law firm... " Non-lawyers also are
prohibited from sharing legal fees with lawyers, or receiving any remuneration for a referral.
N.Y. APP. DIV. CT. R. § 1200.05-c(a)(2) (McKinney 2002). New York's position regarding
MDPs was informed in large part by a report drafted for the New York State Bar Association by
a panel of elite New York lawyers, including Robert MacCrate of Sullivan & Cromwell, Sydney
Cone of Cleary Gottlieb, and Stephen Krane of Proskauer Rose. See SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
THE LAW GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE AND OPERATION, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, PRE-
SERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (2000), available at
http:lwww.nysscpa.orglhomelmdpcenter/nysbareport.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2002) (on file
with CWRU Law Review) [hereinafter PRESERVING CORE VALUES].
Washington, D.C. takes one of the most liberal positions of any state regarding MDPs
through its regulation of ancillary practices by law firms. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.7 cmt. 25 (2000) (discussing lawyers' interests in enterprises not practicing law), available
at http://wwv.dcbar.orgattorney-resources/opinions.cfm#rules (last visited Feb. 14, 2002) (on
file with CWRU Law Review); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR SPECIAL COMMrrrEE ON MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (2001) (recommending reducing
existing regulatory prohibitions on multidisciplinary practice), at http://www.dcbar.org
/about-bar/mdpjreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2002) (on file with CWRU Law Review). The
comment period regarding the report's recommendations extended through January 14, 2002.
Ud.
See also infra notes 30-31 regarding the relationship between Washington, D.C. law firm
McKee Nelson and Ernst & Young.
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in the U.S. is misleading in many respects. 9 Understandably, the de-
bate is phrased in traditional terms. It is presented as a matter of pre-
serving the independence of the legal profession, and professional
values, from the control of business, and business values. The con-
cern over control encompasses a variety of potential problems, but the
general professional argument is that business considerations, includ-
ing efforts to cross-sell other services offered by a law firm or related
business found under the umbrella of MDP, will shape the kind of
advice or representation a lawyer gives." Further, the concern is that
non-lawyers will exert their influence over lawyers in a way that in-
terferes with the lawyers' exercise of professional judgment. Stated
in this way, the concerns comport with the traditional "core values" of
the legal profession.
What is misleading is that the challenge is defined in terms of an
offensive from the Big Five on those values of independence. Arthur
Andersen's role in the Enron debacle thus has been carefully ex-
9 Our focus, as lawyers, is on the practical consequences of MDPs for law and legal
practice. Our perspective has been shaped by a series of interviews conducted primarily by
Garth and Yves Dezalay in connection with their American Bar Foundation study of the role of
law and lawyers. Silver has participated in certain of these interviews as well. The interviews
are referred to numerically in this article to maintain confidentiality.
10 This threat was clearly articulated by Robert MacCrate and his colleagues in their re-
port to the New York State Bar Association:
A legal practice in which nonlawyers play a significant managerial role would
be susceptible to a number of palpable dangers. At the outset, in the selection of
clients and the resolution of conflicts of interest, nonlawyers would influence both
the choice and the application of criteria for weighing the relative interest of the
overall enterprise in serving, for example, a client that is both a legal and nonlegal
client, favoring it over a client that was exclusively a legal client. It can fairly be
predicted that the promotion of nonlegal profit centers will often overshadow the
attorneys' rules governing conflicts of interest. Likewise, the raising and allocation
of firm capital (both debt and equity) would be ultimately controlled by
nonlawyers, who could thereby orient the development of the overall enterprise as
between the practice of law and engagement in other pursuits, and who for these
purposes might well view the practice of law less in professional terms than in
terms of being but one of several profit centers. Investment in the legal profit cen-
ter might thus be controlled for purposes other than maximizing legal professional-
ism and fostering its values ... In sum, placing any measure of control over the
practice of law in the hands of nonlawyers would form a constant backdrop for the
lawyers attempting to practice in the organization, as the financial objectives of
nonlawyer management perpetually compete with considerations of professional
ethics and the formulation of independent judgments in the best interests of legal
clients and the legal system.
PRESERVING CORE VALUES, supra note 8, at 385-86.
1 The problem is no longer stated as the pursuit of profit versus professional values. It is
apparent to all that law firms pursue profit, and that this pursuit has consequences in law firm
management as well as in the way firms staff their work and select clients. As one lawyer prac-
ticing in London put it, "[Tihere really have been two main arguments about [MDPs]. One is
that it introduces commercialism into a... profession and two, that it in some way sullies the
quality of the product that you get. Quite frankly, to suggest these days that law is not a com-
mercial business is such nonsense as to be beyond contempt." Interview #3, at 41.
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plained as the result of Andersen's fear of losing the lucrative consult-
ing business derived from Enron.1 2 This strategic framing of Enron
fails to ask why the audit fees are relatively low in relation to consult-
ing.13 It also neglects the parallel behavior of law firms, and notably
12 See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Trying Not to Be the Next Enron, Companies Scrutinize Prac-
tices, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,2002, at C1. The article states:
The independence of Enron's auditor, Arthur Andersen, has been questioned on
many fronts. Enron was one of Andersen's largest clients, and Andersen received
substantial fees for consulting work for Enron - fees that Andersen believed might
reach $100 million a year, about four times its fee as auditor, according to an in-
ternal source.
Id.; Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater, Who's Keeping the Accountant Accountable, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at Cl. The authors note:
Accounting firms have come to rely more on consulting work rather than on tradi-
tional audits for their revenues, raising questions about their ability to stand up to
clients if improper bookkeeping is suspected....
[C]ritics have also argued that auditors are increasingly reluctant to alienate a big
client that may contributd a significant portion of its revenue.
IdA; Bloomberg News, Hedge Fund Sues Auditor and Underwriters Over Bond Loss, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15,2002, at C1 (reporting on a lawsuit filed by four hedge funds that lost millions in
Enron bonds, alleging "that Andersen overlooked Enron's true financial picture 'to continue
earning lucrative fees for the auditing, tax, financial and other consulting services it had pro-
vided'); Charles Krauthammer, Enron in the Woodshed, WASH, POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at A33.
"The other major cause of the Enron debacle was the watchdogs that did not watch, namely, the
Arthur Andersen accounting firm, which, while auditing Enron, was reaping millions in consult-
ing fees, in some cases signing off on partnerships that undermined the transparency and reli-
ability of its own accounting." l; Andy Serwer, Dirty Rotten Numbers, FORTUNE, Feb. 18,
2002, at 74, 80. The article states:
Enron shows auditor/client complicity at its absolute worst. The ties there were so
close that any notion of an 'independent' auditor was lost. Enron hired all sorts of
Arthur Andersen employees, and the auditor billed more than $25 million in con-
sulting fees to the company in 2000.... As for who's auditing the auditors, well,
that's a good question.
Ia
13 See Cromwell Schubarth, Enron effects reach beyond Big Five CPAs, BOSTON HER-
ALD, Feb. 14, 2002, at 34. "'Clients see auditing as a service that isn't that valuable .... They
do it because they have to, because its required for a bank loan or government program, not
because they want to. Most CPA firms do consulting because that's what their clients value and
will pay them for."' IL (quoting Mark Dietrich of Dietrich & Wilson PC). See also the com-
ments of Lynn Turner, former chief accountant of the SEC, regarding Andersen's role in the
Enron collapse:
[Tlypically there's an issue of culture, and... culture is usually ingrained
systematically from the tone at the top down. For example, the C.E.O. or
the head of the audit practice will say, "We want you to do good audits,"
but a good part of their compensation may be based on how much new
business or consulting fees they generate. That becomes ingrained and
you get into the type of recurring situations like we're seeing here, where
people were identifying problems but just didn't get them fixed.
Jonathan D. Glater, Five Questions for Lynn Turner, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 2001, at C5.
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Vinson & Elkins, which also lent its name and credibility to Enron in
order to maintain the client relationship. 14 We are thus skeptical that
MDPs controlled by the Big Five and offering legal services will
promote one-stop shopping, shameless cross-marketing of services,
and a subordination of professional values because of the combination
of auditing and consulting. We do not see the problem as the Big Five
taking advantage of loopholes in global regulation to mount an offen-
sive against more traditional corporate law firms. The Big Five are
seeking to make the best of the relatively weak position that they find
themselves in-despite their huge sizes and quasi-monopoly position
in the auditing field.15 Many law firms, we shall argue, are experienc-
ing similar pressures. More generally, globalization operates in ways
that make the MDP controversy only an incident emerging from more
general factors that are dramatically transforming the global land-
scape for legal and business advice.
Globalization, it is true, brings down some of the barriers be-
tween types of organizations, such as law firms and accounting firms.
The resulting cross-fertilization of nationally based organizational
forms produces hybrid products that may have new competitive ad-
vantages. This hybridization, in fact, was central to the move by the
Big Five into the provision of business legal services, especially in
France, where accounting firms moved into the breach of a bar that
had a traditional contempt for anything that led lawyers into contact
with business-including most notably tax and corporate law.16
14 The REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE OF ENRON'S BOARD OF
DIRECTORS (also known as the Powers Report, after William C. Powers, Jr., who chaired the
investigation committee) accuses Vinson & Elkins of not pressing hard enough to determine
undisclosed information as well as to require disclosure. See WILLIAM POWERS, JR., REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE OF ENRON'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS 178, 191, 199,
available at http:llnytimes.com/images/2002102/03/business/O3powers.pdf. (last visited Mar. 20,
2002) (on file with CWRU Law Review). The report states: "It would be inappropriate to fault
Vinson & Elkins for accounting matters, which are not within its expertise. However, Vinson &
Elkins should have brought a stronger, more objective and more critical voice to the disclosure
process." Id. at 26. "We believe that the responsibility for these inadequate disclosures is shared
by Enron Management, the Audit and Compliance Committee of the Board, Enron's in-house
counsel, Vinson & Elkins, and Andersen." Id. at 178.
1S On the position of accounting firms vis-t-vis their clients and independence,
see Serwer et al., supra note 12, at 78:
Changes in the bean-counting business certainly haven't helped matters. In
the late 1970s the federal government pushed the accounting profession to aban-
don a code of conduct that prevented accounting firms from undercutting one an-
other on price or even soliciting a company that used another of the Big Eight
(now Big Five) firms. The FTC said this was anticompetitive (which it was), but it
also protected accounting firms from CFOs who didn't like being told no. Under
the new rules, if the auditor doesn't play ball with an aggressive CFO, it is much
easier for the company to tell the auditor bye-bye.
16 See Dezaley & Garth, supra note 5, at 520-25.
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As important as the hybrids are, however, it is the changing
business context that allows particular hybrids to prosper and take
root in new jurisdictions. The changing business context, including
expanded global competition and the construction of sophisticated in-
house counsel operations, has challenged the comfortable positions of
corporate law firms around the world. In order to compete, they must
find a way to survive that recognizes a world of competition between
disciplines as well as between lawyers and law firms. There was a day
when law, for all practical purposes, was the only game in town in
premium business advice. But the patterns of practice that worked so
well when law was unchallenged may hinder the ability to adapt in
the new global environment. The challenges that globalization pre-
sents for corporate law firms, we suggest, are far more fundamental
than those presented by MDPs and the Big Five.
Our purpose in this paper, therefore, is to draw on a global per-
spective to reassess the threat of the Big Five and the MDP. We will
proceed by dividing this paper into three parts. Part I will take stock
of recent international developments that can be grouped under the
category of MDP-roughly, for present purposes, professional service
organizations offering legal services as part of a larger entity focused
on business advice. We suggest that the immediate threat to the legal
profession associated with the Big Five is not so dramatic as it seems
to be in media accounts. Part 11 will use the description in Part I to
discuss more generally the phenomenon of multi-disciplinary practice
in the context of globalization. Drawing on earlier sections, Part III
will suggest some more serious challenges for law and the legal pro-
fession.
I. THE MDP UMBRELLA: CAPTIVE LAW FIRMS, STEALTH MDPS,
AND REFERRAL RELATIONSHIPS
There is no clear understanding of what comes within the cate-
gory of the MDP. In part the confusion is a result of the identification
of MDPs with the law firms connected to the Big Five accounting
firms. The fear is that the Big Five will create firms that unify audit
and legal services, and that these firms will become the giants in law
in much the same way that they have monopolized audit and consult-
ing services. There is some support for this concern, as the Big Five
accounting firms-in the pre-Enron era-successfully leveraged their
audit services to become strong global leaders in business consulting.
As a result, these firms could offer a seamless blend of audit and
business consulting services. However, ever since the New Deal cre-
ated a huge market for audit services for the capital markets, the ideal
MDP of audit and business consulting that will satisfy both the CPA-
90920021
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auditors and the MBA-consultants has not yet emerged. 7 It is not just
the lawyers who have taken advantage of Enron to condemn the mix-
ing of business consulting with the audit. Nevertheless, there seems to
be a persistent fear that this kind of ideal MDP could exist with legal
services in the place of business consulting.
Instead of debating what a "rear' MDP would be, we shall try to
avoid confusion here by identifying three ways in which something
like the MDPs in the popular legal consciousness exists in the mar-
ketplace of business and legal advice today. These models of MDP
activity include what we shall term captive law firms, stealth MDPs,
and referral relationships entered into by law firms and non-law or-
ganizations. The categories, as we shall see, are not always easy to
separate.
A. Captive Law Firms
We define captive law firms as organizations that have formally
affiliated with a non-law professional services firm, such as one of the
Big Five accounting firms. It is not clear just how "captive" these
firms are, since they can and do sever their relationships occasion-
ally, 8 but we use this term to emphasize that general legal services
and the Big Five are most closely linked in this model. The spread of
these law firms has fueled the anti-MDP movement, since the number
of lawyers working for the Big Five directly and indirectly has been
proliferating at a tremendous rate--challenging the numerical leader-
ship of the two legal giants Clifford Chance and Baker &
McKenzie. 9
17 See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Andersen Split into Two Firms by Arbitrator, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2000, at Al ("At the heart of dispute was the same thing that has ended hundreds of
other partnerships: money. The last decade, as Andersen Consulting became more profitable
than the firm that had founded it, the consultants began to chafe over sharing their profits with
the accountants.").
18 See Geanne Rosenberg, Is Ernst & Young-Linked U.K Firm a Blueprint for a U.S.
Launch?, NAT'L L.J., July 17, 2000, at B8. Tite & Lewis was originally part of Coopers &
Lybrand's legal network. The two name partners, however, reorganized Tite & Lewis as an
Ernst & Young affiliate a few years after the merger of Coopers and Price Waterhouse.
19 Clifford Chance and Baker & McKenzie each employed over 3,000 lawyers in mid-
2001. See Clifford Chance Website, Clifford Chance News-Key Statistics, at
http://www.cliffordchance.comluk/news/key-statisticstindex.shtml (last visited May 25, 2001)
(on file with CWRU Law Review); Baker & McKenzie Website, Baker & McKenzie Firm Pro-
file, at http:l/www.bakermeLcomlAttorney/defaultasp (last visited May 25, 2001) (on file with
CWRU Law Review).
During the same year, the affiliated law firms of the Big Five employed similar num-
bers of lawyers: 3,400 lawyers at Andersen Legal, 2,600 at PricewaterhouseCoopers' Landwell,
and 3,300 at KPMG's KLegal. See Jean Eaglesham, Bean-Counters Want to Play Too, FIN.
TIME, Mar. 5, 2001, at 16; Geanne Rosenberg, Move Over Baker & McKenzie: Big 5 Have
Arrived-in a Big Way, NAT'L L. J., May 29, 2000, at B6. The Big Five also directly employ
large numbers of lawyers. Ernst & Young, for example, employed 900 lawyers in its tax prac-
tice. Anna Snider, Taking a Look Inside the Big Five, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 7, 1999, at S11. See
910 (Vol. 52:903
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The only feature that distinguishes these captive law firms from
traditional law firms is that they promote the nonlegal services of-
fered by the Big Five network. The captive firm lawyers generate
work through referrals from the Big Five as well as separately in the
way law firms typically operate. According to one lawyer employed
by a Big Five captive law firm, "about 40% of our work had nothing
to do with [the Big Five captor firm] at all. It was work that we gen-
erated ourselves and which we did.",20 A lawyer at another Big Five
captive law firm reported that "we do a lot of dot com start-up work..
. And sometimes, the client comes into us first, sometimes it comes
into the tax practice, sometimes it comes into the.., consulting prac-
tice, and we tend to cross-refer .... In this sense, "captive" may
mean no more than a formalized system of cross-referral relation-
ships. The law firm benefits from the initial referral and the hope that
a lasting client relationship can be developed out of that referral. It is
possible that the captive law firm also could have some economic
dependency on the Big Five firm or even a subordinate relationship to
it in a management hierarchy. 22
We have spoken to lawyers at Big Five captive law firms in
London, Paris, and elsewhere, and they report that these firms are
controlled exclusively by lawyers. 23 One reason given for this ar-
rangement is simply the norms of professional regulation. Another,
however, is a strong sense of what it takes to have credibility with
clients, and to recruit quality lawyers. According to one lawyer at a
Big Five captive firm in London, for example, "if you are competing
with a law firm, you've got to look like a law firm."24 The same law-
yer reported that "the good thing about it is that they want lawyers to
generally, Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, Of Brain Surgeons and Barber Shops: The Eco-
nomic Consequences of MDPs on The Legal Profession, in MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES
AND PARTNERSHIPS: LAWYERS, CONSULTANTS AND CLIENTS (Stephen McGarry ed., forthcom-
ing American Lawyer Media).
2o Interview #2, at 17.
21 Interview #4, at 26. The same lawyer expanded on this notion: "I'd say that.., we've
had a mix 6T clients, some of whom are clients who have stuck with the firm because of a rela-
tionship with the partners; some of whom instruct the firm as part ... of a joint proposal with
[the Big Five accounting firm]; and some... [who] got to know the firm because of a joint
relationship with [the Big Five accounting firm], and are now instructing us directly on ... that
basis.... Our goal is to turn the second catch pin into the third catch pin, and build strong direct
relationships with the clients." Id. at 24-25.
22 See generally, Jens Drolshammer, The Future Legal Structure of International Law
Firms-Is the Experience of the Big Five in Structuring, Auditing and Consulting Organizations
Relevant?, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW 449 (Jens Drolshammer
& Michael Pfeifer eds., 2001) (discussing the internationalization of legal services and law firms
in comparison to the Big Five).
23 According to one lawyer at a London Big Five captive firm, "I have also heard anecdo-
tal tales of'the accountants interfering in everything or they just can't stop interfering, as a rea-
son why [a firm] didn't work. Well, I haven't seen that here, yet." Interview #1, at 27.
24 Interview#l,at5l.
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run the legal business. The accountants are not going to run this as it
were, they couldn't, and they are very committed to building some-
thing that in theory and in practice... could be a significant legal
practice. ."25 A similar comment was made by a lawyer at another
of the Big Five captive firms in London:
[T]he law market is, as you know, it's a very distinct market,
particularly in an Anglo-American context, and if one is to be
perceived as a credible player in that market, then I think it's
important to have a position as a law firm. Having a relation-
ship with another professional services practice is very valu-
able and very important, too, but one has to have that dual
approach to the way in which one goes to market.26
The potential competitive advantage of a captive law firm varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In many countries, for example, cor-
porate law firms tend to be family-dominated, 27 and there is also a
tradition in many places of lawyers seeking to remain aloof from
business and commerce.28 The captive firm breaks away from those
traditions by linking the innovation to the prestige of the foreign insti-
tution and the resources of the foreign clients. The new models of
law firms can move directly into the business area, recruit generally,
and provide the business services that clients seek in the places where
they invest. The link to business also encourages lawyers to provide
more than merely technical legal advice. Thus one London Big Five
captive firm lawyer described this difference as follows:
[W]e see ourselves as broadening the choice-widening the
choice-if you will, that's out there in the marketplace. We
think it's more rewarding for lawyers because one is inevi-
tably doing a wider range of work. It's not just narrow legal
work. We see ourselves much more [in] a business advi-
sor's role and, of course, we have the technical legal skills,
which must be a given, but our interest is in building rela-
tionships with the clients that go outside the narrow legal
base.29
25 Interview#I, at26.
26 Interview #2, at 19. The same lawyer articulated his aim of establishing his firm as a
competitor in the legal market when asked about his goals for five years in the future, "For us,
the model is to be clearly a world class law firm." Id.
27 See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE
WARS 39-40 (2002) (discussing family-run law firms in Argentina and Mexico).
28 See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 5, at 520-22 (discussing opposition by the'French and
Spanish bars toward identification with business).
29 Interview #2, at 26.
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Thus, captive law firms may encourage their lawyers to take a
broader perspective of the lawyer's role than is characteristic of law-
yers at traditional firms located in the same jurisdiction. In this way,
the captive law firm functions as a competitor in much the same way
that a U.S. law firm's foreign office competes with domestic firms
abroad, by offering clients a different and more business-oriented ap-
proach than is typical of the domestic lawyer.
Within the U.S., so far the only efforts to build arrangements
akin to the European captive firms have come in the field of tax. One
example is McKee Nelson in Washington, D.C., a firm that was or-
ganized in 1999 by two tax specialists, describing itself as "An Inde-
pendent Law Firm Allied With Ernst & Young., 30  As of January
2002, McKee Nelson had positioned itself to offer legal advice on
"tax litigation, transactional structuring, and capital markets needs of
companies doing business in the global economy.",31 It remains to be
seen, however, just how well McKee Nelson will evolve out of the
area of tax, which large law firms in the U.S. have essentially left to
the Big Five (and a few leading U.S. boutique firms), or indeed
whether it will gain enough referrals from Ernst & Young to prosper
as more than a tax boutique.
While tax was the initial impetus to expand more fully into law,
part of the Big Five strategy has been to develop the captive firms
apart from tax. In London, for example, captive law firms did not be-
gin as tax firms. Landwell, PricewaterhouseCooper's captive firm in
London, does not "have any tax lawyers working in the firm," accord-
ing to one of its partners. Tax advice is instead offered by the lawyers
working directly for PricewaterhouseCoopers. Similarly, K-Legal in
London, the captive law firm of KPMG, does not offer tax advice.
The Big Five policies on including tax in their captive law firms vary
from place to place, depending in part on the competition offered by
the local bar. Thus, in London, where finance and capital markets
30 See McKee Nelson LLP Website, McKee Nelson LLP, Our Firm (quoting the banner
heading on page), at http://www.mckeenelson.comlourflrmcommonquestionsfindex.cfm Oast
Oct. 15, 2001) (on file with CWRU Law Review). The firm's website offers the following
perspective on the relationship between Ernst & Young and McKee Nelson:
Q: Does Ernst & Young LLP own McKee Nelson LLP?
A: No. Ernst & Young has no ownership interest in or control over
McKee Nelson. McKee Nelson is an independent law firm. We have formed an al-
liance with Ernst & Young to share resources and work together to serve clients
who choose to retain both finms. However, we each have our own clients, and we
make professional and management decisions independently.
Id.
31 The firm's website reported it as comprised of twenty-six partners, twenty-nine associ-
ates, three lawyers of counsel, and three counsels in January 2002. See McKee Nelson LLP
Website, supra note 30.
20021
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
work is most prestigious, the captive firms are working on developing
in these areas in order to compete for both clients and legal talent with
the Magic Circle32 and other top English firms. The setting in Lon-
don, in addition, has permitted the captive law firms to step into the
same position as the solicitors firms. The only strong opposition has
come from the bar, which represents the interests of barristers, not
solicitors.33 In Paris, on the other hand, where the Paris bar has
strongly attacked the Big Five captive firms, tax practices were a way
for lawyers in the Big Five to avoid regulatory attacks.34
B. Stealth MDPs
The second example of MDP activity picks up just where the
captive firm example leaves off, with something we refer to as
"stealth" MDPs.35 Stealth MDPs are non-law professional service
firms that offer services traditionally performed by lawyers through
employees educated in the law. These services include corporate in-
vestigations, where the identification of material information is cru-
cial, and tax advisory activities, where the clash between the account-
ants and lawyers traditionally has been waged.36 Entities offering
business advice in other areas, such as mergers and acquisitions, envi-
ronmental matters, or human resources, also employ law graduates
and draw on their expertise.37 Before the recent economic downturn,
32 The Magic Circle refers to five elite London law firms: Slaughter and May, Linklaters
& Alliance, Allen & Overy, Freshfields, and Clifford Chance Rogers & Wells.
33 See The Bar Council, at http://www.barcouncil.org.uktdocument.asp (last visited Jan.
27, 2002) (on file with CWRU Law Review). Barristers cite the collapse of Enron as "demon-
strat[ing] the importance of maintaining the bar as an independent profession." Joshua Rozen-
berg, Go-Ahead for Direct Access to Barristers, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Feb. 4, 2002, at
9. See also Brennan, supra note 7; Suzanne Kapner, Enron Fiasco Lends Europeans to Recon-
sider Ties Between Accounting and Legal Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, at A25. ("'The
Enron episode fans the flames of a debate that is about to be played out in the United Kingdom,'
said Jon McLeod, a spokesman for the Bar Council for England and Wales. 'It demonstrates the
need for independence among lawyers, auditors and all types of professional advisors."').
34 See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 5, at 520-25. The European Court of Justice recently
upheld the validity of rules restricting Dutch lawyers from entering into a partnership with a Big
Five Accounting Firm in the Opinion of the Advocate General Philippe l.ger, Case C-309-99,
Wouters v. NOVA, 2002 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 186, at *1 (Feb. 19, 2002). The opinion is also
available at http://www.curia.eu.intlen/cp/aff/cp02l5en.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
35 See Garth & Silver, supra note 19, at 9.
36 For descriptions of these services, see PricewaterhouseCoopers Website, Deal Execu-
tion, at http://www.pwcglobal.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (on file with CWRU Law Re-
view) and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Website, Services, at http://www.deloitte.com (last visited
Oct. 15,2001) (on file with CWRU Law Review).
37 See Charles W. Wolfram, In-House MDPs?, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 6,2000, at B6:
One obvious possibility [of MDPs going beyond lawyers in accounting
firms] is that other companies, including many kinds of consulting companies
not involved in accounting-e.g., environmental, economic, lobbying, public
relations-will want to follow the lead of the Big Five. Many such compa-
nies are presumably now doing market research on whether it would be sensi-
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law schools were focusing considerable attention on the number of
graduates moving into positions in consulting companies, such as the
Boston Consulting Group and McKinsey and Company, and invest-
ment banks, most notably Goldman Sachs, and also a large variety of
venture capital firms and takeover firms. Sometimes these moves are
simply defined as a quest for talent, but they are also seen as a reflec-
tion of an increased role of law in business (complementing the in-
creased role of business in law).
The most obvious example of these developments towards the
stealth MDP is the move twenty years or more ago of the Big Five
into tax consulting services, which is an area that is now staffed with
large numbers of lawyers. According to a lawyer at one Big Five
captive law firm:
[I]n most of the Big Five, law is part of tax. That means that
law is a subset of tax. It's owned by tax and therefore the
work which the lawyers do tends to be tax related, so tax re-
structurings, reorganizations, other tax-driven deals that in-
evitably puts a, if you will, an informal restriction on the sort
of other work that one is able to develop.
38
The Big Five built their tax practices initially out of their audits,
with accountants leading the way. Later, however, they began to hire
lawyers, and their recent success has come in part by "recruiting high-
profile professionals, government officials.... [They] hired all the
commissioners coming out of the Internal Revenue Service, the Inter-
national Counsels coming out of Treasury, and then they hired all the
senior tax officials, people coming out of Commerce .... 39 One
lawyer, now with a Big Five captive law firm, reported on conversa-
tions in the early 1990s with the heads of tax at several Big Five
firms: "They all had, surprisingly, ... a very similar view of the
world, and they were all convinced that law practice along side their
tax capability would add a lot of value to clients.. ."40 This pattern
ble and profitable to market their own kind of MDP services, based on their
traditional consulting, to include legal services in the product mix by employ-
ing a new or existing staff of inside legal counsel. For the potential service
provider, the arrangement would offer new opportunities for growth in ser-
vices and sales. For customers of such companies, the prospect of being able
to negotiate for one-stop business consulting along with legal advice or other
legal services, such as drafting, may offer convenience, economy and better
management of large projects. Nonetheless, although potentially important in
some consulting areas, such expansion would probably constitute only a
modest spread of MDP practice.
3" Interview #2, at 14-15.
39 Interview #7, at 30.
40 Interview #4, at. 5.
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of expansion from tax into other services was the common evolution
towards stealth MDPs.
C. Referral Relationships
The third example of MDPs is the creation of formal referral re-
lationships between law and non-law firms. Law firms in the U.S.
have teamed up with non-lawyers to capture potential referrals from
notable consultants and strategic advisors. 41 For example, Chicago's
McDermott, Will & Emery has established a referral relationship with
former Secretary of Defense William Cohen's consultancy group, 42
and also recently announced that it hired the former Senior Tax Part-
ner of PricewaterhouseCoopers as a Senior Director of Tax Services
in its London office.43 The reports regarding McDermott's affiliation
with the Cohen group included references to a hefty fee paid by
McDermott in order to link with Cohen.
Law firms have long enjoyed informal referral relationships with
particular kinds of clients, such as commercial and investment banks.
Examples include the relationships between Shearman & Sterling and
Citibank, Sullivan & Cromwell and Goldman Sachs, and Davis, Polk
& Wardwell and Morgan Stanley and J.P. Morgan. These banking
clients engage in repeated transactions similar enough in structure so
that it is efficient to engage the same legal adviser, who will bring
knowledge gained from experience in similar transactions to subse-
quent transactions. Consequently, the banks regularly refer their cus-
tomers to the law firms with which they have established relation-
ships; the law firms represent their banking clients in some transac-
41 See Garth & Silver, supra note 19, at 41. The article further relates:
The alliance between McDermott, Will & Emery, a Chicago-based law
firm, and William Cohen's new international strategic consulting business,
the Cohen Group, is part of a web of relationships being developed by Mr.
Cohen. The group includes the public relations firm, Fleishman-Hillard,
and a private equity firm, Thayer Capital Partners, and additional alliances
with an investment bank and a hedge fund are anticipated. Through these
alliances, the participating firms intend to "work jointly on projects and...
steer business to one another".... A similar alliance exists between Wash-
ington, D.C.-based Hogan & Hartson, Lehman Brothers, and Stonebridge
International, founded by former national security advisor to President Clin-
ton Samuel R. Berger. Mr. Berger described his current position as "a con-
tinuation of what I've been doing in my career, which is to open markets
and develop business."
Id. (quoting Leslie Wayne Turning Government Experience Into Corporate Advice, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23,2001, at CI).
42 See Otis Bilodeau, First Strike: Ex-Defense Chief on Global Business Crusade, LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 12,2001, at 1.
43 See Press Release, McDermott, Will & Emery, McDermott, Will & Emery Enhances
Tax Offering With New Senior Accountancy Hire 1 (Sept. 10, 2001), at http:/
www.mwe.com/press / madewell.htm (on file with CWRU Law Review).
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tions and the banks' customers in other transactions where the bank
also is a party.
The specific difference between these sorts of informal relation-
ships that have traditionally been enjoyed by law firms and the more
formal type of referrals that come under the rubric of the MDP is dif-
ficult to discern. The informal referral relationship presumably is
sustained only as long as the client receives quality legal services;
perhaps most important is that the relationship may be discontinued at
any time by either side. In contrast, referral relationships established
by fee payments may not be cancelable at will. Instead, the client has
in effect sold its discretion to recommend or select legal counsel. But
from the law firm's perspective, there may be little meaningful differ-
ence between the informal and more formal relationships. In eitfier
case, the law firm is under pressure to deliver the type of service that
will please the referring firm. In the competitive global market for
legal services, this pressure is likely to shape a law firm's response as
much in the context of an informal relationship as it will in the case of
a formal referral relationship. 44 This same incentive to keep the larg-
est clients happy was certainly one factor in Andersen's response to
Enron's financial maneuverings. 45
D. Taking Stock of the Global MDP Experience
It is difficult from the previous description to find the global
threat to corporate law firms through the imposition of business
norms identified with the Big Five. We can characterize arrangements
as captive or stealth, but they do not excite much fear as they have
been described so far. There are privileged referral arrangements now
formalized into global law firms affiliated with the Big Five, but the
feared trend of compulsory lawyer cross-referrals has not material-
ized. Instead, what have emerged are law firms-captive to the Big
Five-trying to gain a competitive advantage in order to survive. The
Big Five firms are taking advantage of the lack of investment of the
corporate law firms in tax, and the willingness of lawyers to gain ad-
vantage (or at least training and some referrals) by affiliating with the
Big Five. But again, it is hard to see a global MDP threat in these ac-
tivities. Similarly, as we have described the stealth MDPs, the situa-
tion is mainly one of hiring lawyers to do work that has a legal aspect.
44 Observers of the Enron debacle point to the same tension as characteristic of Arthur
Andersen's relationship to Enron. See supra notes 12-13.
45 See Abelson & Glater, supra note 12, at C9. "'There's no way that you could have a
client which is that huge and important to you and not be tempted to turn your head away from
problems,' said Dan L. Goldwasser, a lawyer who often advises accountants. 'If the audit part-
ner who's on the Enron account lost that account, they were history."' Id.
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Again, the practice seems quite natural, since a good deal of business
advice includes a legal component. It is not immediately obvious
why this hiring of lawyers into business settings poses any threat for
corporate law firms or the core values of the legal profession.
II. THE EMERGING CONTEXT FOR THE MDP DEBATE
Our presentation so far tracks most of the debates in the United
States, but it is limited to a description of the corporate law firms and
a brief investigation of their apparent challengers. We have left global
business-the entities that seek legal and business advice-out of the
picture. We have also left out the development of new expertise and
specialties that compete with law for professional service relation-
ships with global businesses. These entities and approaches around
the law are crucial to understanding what the MDP challenge actually
represents to law firms and professional values. 46
It is interesting to examine the Big Five from a different perspec-
tive. Instead of seeing the Big Five as simply business entities looking
to build their profits through the proliferation of services that can be
provided to one-stop-shoppers, we should consider the pressures that
have been placed on their central product: the audit.
On the one hand, we have to point to a story of great success.
The Big Five dominate the market for large corporate audits, thanks
to the role given to accountants by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and indeed large corporations must have a Big Five audit to
provide the credibility they need to issue and sell securities in the
U.S. As more and more companies worldwide need that credibility
with U.S. financial markets and regulators, the demand for Big Five
audits has grown tremendously, fueling a great expansion within the
large industrial countries and also throughout the world. The growth
and competition at the top has also promoted the consolidation of the
accounting giants, from the Big Eight to the current Big Five.
The Big Five, twenty years ago would staff audit jobs with many
low level auditors and a few senior people. One senior accountant
explained that the staffing resembled a pyramid.47 Staff and senior
auditors did the investigative work of the audit, supervised by manag-
ers. The partner arrived on the scene only after the investigation was
completed, reviewed the issues raised by juniors, examined the finan-
cial statements, discussed the audit with the client, and signed the
opinion. A partner's participation was limited to a couple of days,
46 See generally Thomas D. Morgan, Toward a New Perspective on Legal Ethics, The
Keck Lecture on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (discussing a new approach to legal
ethics), at http://www.abf-sociolegal.org/keck.lecture.html (Feb. 13, 2000).
47 Interview #8. at 11-12.
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generally, and this meant that the bulk of the audit fee was earned
through time spent by junior staff. The resemblance of this structure
of billing to a traditional law firm is quite evident and probably not
coincidental. It was also the case for both the Big Five and law firms
prior to the 1960s and 1970s that the clients were relatively stable.
They did not aggressively shop for better rates from competitors-or
shake up the landscape through mergers and acquisitions.
There are major changes today. Partly as a result of the rise in
importance of the Chief Financial Officer (in many cases a former
partner of the Big Five),48 which relates to the increasing competi-
tiveness of the business world, there is intense competition over fees.
According to a senior auditor at one Big Five firm, clients put enor-
mous pressure on the Big Five to keep audit fees down.
[T]here's a lot of pressure to keep audit costs down.
I think for the most part, corporate America views the
audit as a commodity. And not a real value add. So
... it's something that they need to go through be-
cause the SEC says they have to have the opinion on
the financial statements. And so they do. But the
pressure is always on cost, keep the costs down ....
And frankly ... auditors don't want to argue with
their clients about fees. Because they just don't want
to open the door for . . . the client to say, "Okay,
maybe I'll go see what two other firms might tell me
they charge.
4 9
48 The importance of the CFO is evident from the following response:
The Financial Executives Institute is a great thing for us to get involved
with, but they won't let partners in audit firms be members. They'll let-
turns out that they'll let the CFO of an accounting firm, like the chief ac-
counting officer join. But they won't let audit partners. Because they're
afaid that, you know, there would be hundreds of audit partners running
around these meetings trying to meet the CFOs of all these companies. And
they just wanted to keep it down, so. If we could get active in that, we
would. But probably what would happen is all the CFOs would stay away
from the meetings and we'd have the meetings filling up, you know, part-
ners from accounting firms and looking at each other.
Interview #8, at 43.
On the tendency of accounting firms to staff corporate managers, including CFOs, see
Andrew Countryman & Janet Kidd Stewart, Conflicts Common in Audit Oversight, CHL TRIB.,
Feb. 17, 2001, at 1 ("[A] significant number of troubled firms employ executives in key posts
who previously worked at their audit firms-a common career path that raises concerns about
auditors having little personal incentive to ask tough questions as they cheek companies'
books.").
49 Interview #8, at 12, 15-16.
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In addition, clients today tend to demand that partners be involved in
every step of an audit, and the role of auditors is circumscribed be-
cause the external auditors come into the process in a more limited
capacity, relying on internal auditors' work-50 and also on technologi-
cally-based systems for audits.51 Audit staffs today are more vertical
than the earlier pyramid shaped, with senior and junior level staff
more evenly represented during all phases of the audit.
As a result of these staffing and system changes, combined with
the increasing price competition, firms could not generate high audit
fees by using the cheaper junior staff auditors to perform the lion's
share of the work. They must bid with fixed prices for the audits, and
they must hold prices down. They cannot seek to provide better or
higher value audits, since the audit is considered essentially a com-
modity that any of the Big Five can provide. The only difference-at
least in the pre-Enron days-is price. Whether clients will pay more
for better, or at least more credible, audits post-Enron remains to be
seen.
If partner profits cannot grow simply by leveraging more junior
auditors,52 there is a pressure to find other services that can command
higher fees. Accounting firms have needed to find ways to make
money using the human capital they had-auditors-but without
sending them out to work on audits.53 The result was the use of audi-
tors to develop "products" that the firm could sell to its audit clients
and other businesses, and the ideas for these products came from
5o These internal auditors are sometimes hired from a company's external audit firm. See
David S. Hilzenrath, Enron's "Outside" Accountants Also Did Inside Audit, WASH. POST, Dec.
14,2001, at El.
51 DAVID GRAYSON ALLEN & KATHLEEN MCDERMOTT, ACCOUNTING FOR SUCCESS: A
HISTORY OF PRICE WATERHOUSE IN AMERICA 1890-1990 (1993). "As electronic spreadsheet
software became readily available, accountants and auditors were increasingly forced to rely on
electronic records.., auditors needed to know much more about computer technology and its
applications .... As the pace of automated audit tasks accelerated, the auditor's focus changed
as well, with greater emphasis placed on systematic risk analysis and analytical review. The
growing sophistication of computer technology and its applications called for a new mix of
audit personnel and for greater allocation of manager and partner time to an assignment." Id. at
212-13.
52 See Interview #8, at 15. "I think ... back in the '50s, '60s, and even the '70s, that's
how the partners made their money. Because they, for the most part, were not out at the clients
actually charging billable hours.., as much as the people below them were.... [The young
people used to work hard, 60 hour weeks, you know, and they put a lot of hours in. And that's
how the partners ultimately made their money, for the most part. ""And is that still true?" "No,
it's not true." Id.
53 In 1979 PricewaterhouseCoopers, then PriceWaterhouse, hired McKinsey and Co. "to
assess its strategic position. Inviting those from outside the profession to examine the firm
would have been unthinkable a decade earlier, and even in 1979, some partners looked askance
at the prospect." ALLEN & McDERMOTT, supra note 51, at 222. This followed the realization
that management consulting was becoming a larger part of the accounting firm's time and prof-




knowledge of clients gained from auditing. Various kinds of products
have been developed by the accounting firms, including many tax
products and, recently, products that respond to concerns about pri-
vacy and secrecy issues raised by websites and Internet technology.
The same pressure on profits helped fuel the development of
business consulting as part of the Big Five. The source of the initia-
fives was partly the expertise in technology that came with the audit
requirements, but the diminishing returns from auditing no doubt
helped to channel investment into consulting. Andersen Consulting
(now Accenture) was especially successful in developing this market,
but the consulting businesses were quite profitable generally. As it
turned out, however, the consulting businesses, which often employed
MBAs who looked down on the auditors, never fit comfortably with
the regulated world of the auditors.54 The Andersen split was the
most visible manifestation of the problem, but there was a more gen-
eral level of discomfort, reflected in the position of the chief account-
ant at the SEC, with the potential combination of consulting and au-
diting.55 Even those who supported the combination were concerned
about the limits; for example, the dilemma of a Big Five firm taking a
financial position in a client.56 The Enron scandal has brought out the
collective voice of those who wish to protect the traditional audit.
The accounting firms have run into the problems of combining
their closely regulated auditing profession and its professional norm
of independence with the pressures to enhance profitability through
the cross-selling of other services and expertise. At present, there are
efforts to combine auditing with new potential products and services,
and these efforts can enhance the profitability of the commodity that
auditing has become. The tax practice, which has grown considerably
both domestically and internationally since the 1960s, has been one
area where the Big Five have been able to hire talent and compete for
4 The recent announcement by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu that the firm would split its
audit and consulting practices brings the last of the Big Five to the separation point. Deloitte
was unusual in that its consultants "actually get on with their colleagues in the audit side of the
firm." "There has always been a love-hate relationship between the two sides of the Big Five
organizations--the consultants, when they were growing up, relied on the good names of the
audit firms for credibility. But more recently, many felt the old audit practices were holding
them back, preventing them from competing fully in what had become a highly competitive
marketplace." Deloitte's in 'Split' U-Turn, AccouNTANcy AGE, Feb. 14,2002, at 10.
55 Securities Exchange Act Schedule 14A, Item 9 requires companies to disclose in their
proxy statements fees paid to their auditors for audit services as well as for non-audit consulting
services. 17 C.F.1. § 240.14A-101 (2002). See Laura S. Unger, Acting Chairman SEC, This
Year's Proxy Season: Sunlight Shines on Auditor Independence and Executive Compensation,
Speech at the Center for Professional Education, Inc., Washington, D.C. (June 25, 2001) (dis-
cussing Andersen's role in the Waste Management case), available at http:/lwww.sec.gov/news
/speech/spch502.htm.
56 See generally Serwer, supra note 12, at 80 (discussing the related practice of vendor
financing).
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high-end business. But the loss or diminution of the consulting arms
has reduced the possibilities of attracting high-end business graduates.
The general picture of recruiting for the Big Five, therefore, is the
following:
[F]rom the accounting standpoint, we go to the major sources
of undergraduate accountants... in the Midwest it's Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Iowa, Notre Dame, DePaul, Miami of
Ohio. Those are the real key sources for us in the Midwest.
And they give great programs and very bright young people.
The supply so far is fine. Tax does a little recruiting, you
know, at that level [, and]... some of the schools have Mas-
ters of Taxation programs [, including DePaul] .... And so
we'll look at ... people coming out of those to try to identify
candidates for the tax practice.
The recent effort by accounting firms to create a new "global cre-
dential" represented an initiative to offer a more attractive credential
than that of CPA or auditor.58 The new global credential was sup-
ported by innovators from more elite settings, who wished to use the
global credential as a way of attracting talent and competing with
MBAs. But the credential was defeated because the rank and file of
the accounting profession wanted to keep the purity of the CPA. The
core values ensured the weaker status of the CPA.
The story of the transformation of the legal profession parallels
the story of accounting. Since the late nineteenth century, corporate
law firms have occupied a key role in the provision of legal and busi-
ness advice. There were no real disciplinary competitors until the
mid-twentieth century, as business schools were not yet regarded as
producers of a competing expertise. The major law firms had stable
client relationships, and partners could earn substantial economic re-
wards simply by hiring associates who would work enough hours for
there to be a nice surplus to divide up among the partners. The major
law firms were uniformly organized, all following the pattern estab-
lished by Cravath, Swaine & Moore and known as the Cravath model.
According to this model, firms selected new lawyers from the
pool of potential associates consisting of fresh graduates of the law
schools, which had long-standing relationships with the leading cor-
porate law firms. Partners could motivate the associates to work hard
by the promise that those whom the partners particularly valued
57 Interview #8, at 54.
58 See Press Release, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA Mem-
bers Vote Down Bylaw Amendment I (Jan. 3, 2002) (announcing the rejection of "a proposed




would be invited into the partnership.59 The relationships between
businesses and their lawyers were quite stable, as there was little of
the buying and selling of businesses that takes place today in the
global business context. The corporate lawyers who advised the
businesses naturally became closely acquainted with the business
leadership and at times even moved into leading roles in business.6
This proximity and the institutional expertise enabled leading lawyers
to provide knowledgeable business as well as legal advice. Ambitious
people who wanted to be influential in the business world could work
through the corporate law firms, and therefore law firms attracted tal-
ented and well-connected individuals. Galanter and Palay suggest that
the Golden Age for this Cravath model was the 1960s, before the re-
cent increase in competition.61 The Cravath model was imitated by
virtually all other law firms--each looking for people with credentials
as close as possible to those of the Cravath elite.
This corporate law firm model was closely imitated by the in-
vestment banks offering financial expertise, business consultants of-
fering management expertise, and the accounting firms. Management
consultants and investment banks in particular succeeded in develop-
ing expertise-linked to the leading business schools in precisely the
same way that law firms linked to law schools-that vied for suprem-
acy with law. Indeed, those that most closely followed the corporate
law firm model, McKinsey and Company and Goldman Sachs, be-
came the most prestigious in their fields. They now compete globally
with law firms to offer business expertise and even legal expertise,
both through their law graduate employees and from their ability to
bring in lawyers and law firms in a subordinate relationship.
Not only is there competition to serve the major companies, but
also the companies now compete to acquire top legal expertise to
govern their businesses. Just as the companies recruited high-powered
CFOs from the Big Five to control and commoditize the Big Five, the
companies, under the influence of the MBAs and the pressure of in-
creased competition, have brought in high-powered general counsel,
typically from prestigious law firms, to occupy the key position as
legal advisor to the business leadership and controller of outside
59 See generally ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819-
1948 (1948).
60 See ZWEIG, supra note 2, at 223-24 (discussing the relationship between Citibank and
Shearman & Sterling).
6t See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 20 (1991) ("We
locate this golden age in... the late 1950s and the early 1960s.").
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counsel. 62 These advisors provide another threat to the prosperity andposition of the law firms.
I. FivE CHALLENGES REFLECTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MDPs
While the conventional challenge posed by MDPs, as currently
operating, may not constitute a serious threat to lawyers' profession-
alism, several important challenges are raised by the processes that
led to the entry of the Big Five and their so-called MDPs into the in-
ternational market for legal services. The challenges, which come
from increasing competition and globalization, are experienced dif-
ferently by distinct segments of the legal profession; what constitutes
a challenge to one segment, whether defined by national border, size
or specialty, may not be perceived as a serious threat to another.
The movements we identify as challenges are potential threats to
the traditional Cravath model of corporate legal services, which is
descriptive of the Cravath firm and its counterparts in every city of
the United States and most of the major cities of the world. The
model has been very successful for a very long time, and it fits the
interests of law firm partners especially well. Not surprisingly, the
firms that are most likely to ignore or minimize these challenges, and
any call for reform, are those that continue to prosper in the market
today. First, MDPs challenge the lawyers' dominant position in the
hierarchy of professional service advisers to business. This challenge
manifests itself in competition for recruitment and retention of talent.
Second, MDPs present the challenge of going global. Non-law pro-
fessional service firms, including the Big Five and top consulting
firms, engaged in international expansion well before most law firms.
They are experienced in managing multiple foreign and domestic of-
fices, and in implementing transnational quality control and training
systems. Also, they are experienced in integrating foreign employees
and partners into the fabric of their firms. In these ways, they are
ahead of law firms and lawyers in the quest to "go global." Third,
MDPs challenge the traditional U.S. law firms' reliance on the bill-
able hour, which is tied to a hierarchical model of associate hours
supporting partner profits. The fourth challenge comes from the fact
that the traditional law firm is a provider of only one expertise, the
law, and is losing the ability to orchestrate other expertises. Finally,
MDPs present a related challenge to the traditional law firms' practice
of allowing each lawyer individually to determine which and what
62 See Mary Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering For A
Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1057 (1997)
(discussing the growing role of in-house counsel, many of whom are drawn from prominent law
firms).
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level of professional services to market to a given client. Each of
these challenges is discussed below.
A. The Recruiting Challenge
The first challenge posed by MDPs is the recruiting challenge.
In order to compete in any professional services market, including
legal services, firms must hire and retain quality people. 63 Quality is
perceived very similarly in the various kinds of professional services
firms. The leading firms exemplified by Cravath, Swaine & Moore in
law, Goldman Sachs in investment banking, and McKinsey and Com-
pany in business consulting, all seek what they define as raw talent.
64
They understand that the very same individuals, whatever their de-
grees, will succeed in these environments. As one descends in the
hierarchy, however, technical expertise also becomes crucial,65 along
with willingness to be a team player and to put in long hours. 66 The
Big Five, top consulting firms, and investment banks pull their new
recruits from graduates of law schools, MBA programs, and a range
of undergraduate programs, as well as from areas less intimately con-
nected to commerce, such as medical schools. 67 They rely on their
63 Typical is the statement of Jim Copeland, CEO of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, "We
think this business is all about people and intellectual capital, so whoever wins the people wars
wins the war altogether." The Friday Interview - Jim Copeland, IRISH TIMES, May 4, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 19184040.
6 Consider, for example, McKinsey and Company's assertion that "they ... are interested
in people with strong leadership skills, intellectual vigor, personal integrity, and analytical
skills. There's no right background, school, or degree." McKinsey and Company Website,
Working at McKinsey, at http://www.mckinsey.com/careers/working/ (last visited Oct. 15,
2001) (on file with CWRU Law Review).
6 Many providers of non-legal services, including some of the Big Five, are happy to hire
smart people without the technical training and put them through an intense training program in-
house:
[The management consulting practice] ... goes to the major MBA programs, the
consulting people, they look at the major MBA programs. And they'll take
some-they'll take undergrads out of almost any school. They've developed...
[a] capabilities test that's pretty predictive of whether people would be good at
consulting. No matter what their undergraduate degree is... we've hired people
with geography degrees that ... do well [on the test] and we go send them to train-
ing to teach them how to be consultants and how to implement systems. And they
do very well.
Interview #8, at 54.
The idea of being a team player is not as prominent in the recruiting rhetoric of law
firms as compared to other professional service firms, although its recognition as a valuable
characteristic is increasing. Consider Sullivan & Cromwell's emphasis on a "hands-on, team
approach to the practice of law [with] ... a constant give and take of ideas, frank and open
communication, and a willingness to learn from one another" in describing its work environ-
ment. See Sullivan & Cromwell Website, Why S&C?, at http://www.sullcrom.com (last visited
Oct. 15,2001) (on file with CWRU Law Review).
67 McKinsey, for example, recruits from all academic disciplines. In 2000, their analysts
had degrees "in more than 50 disciplines from more than 250 schools worldwide." McKinsey
and Company Website, Consulting Roles, at http.//www.mckinsey.com/careers/apply/ opportu-
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own training programs to focus the intellect brought by such diverse
recruits; law firms, in contrast, traditionally have relied only on the
common core of. training from law school, and they only recently
have begun to invest seriously in in-house training for new associ-
ates.
68
A key challenge for law firms in this environment is to occupy a
position in business relationships sufficiently important to attract the
best talent. One element in the competition between non-law and law
firms is the perceived status of the professional service in the hierar-
chy of professional advisors. This hierarchy is related to which type
of service firm occupies the role of quarterback for clients. 69 If one
type of professional service firm is considered more central to clients
than others, that type of firm will gain the upper hand in the recruiting
wars. Law firms vie for that top position with consultants and invest-
ment bankers (and perhaps accountants) through their rhetoric about
the role they fulfill for the client and their efforts to occupy the posi-
tion closest to the business leadership.
The terms of the competition are reflected often in the ways that
firms characterize their relationships with business clients. For exam-
ple, one lawyer at a Big Five captive law firm characterized his firm's
approach as "'much more of a business advisor's role ... our interest
is in building relationships with the clients that go outside the narrow
legal base., 70  Similarly, in describing the difference in attitude be-
nitieslongoing/index.asp#businessanalyst (last visited March 29, 2002) (on file with CWRU
Law Review).
68 See Adam Breslin, Taking Advantage of the Training Dividend, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 11,
2000, at 43-44 (describing training strategies of McKinsey, other consulting and investment
banking firms, and the new training programs at several national law firms).
69 See generally Keith Clark, Introduction, in THE CLIFFORD CHANCE MILLENNIUM LEC-
TUREs: THE COMING TOGETHER OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW 1, 7-8 (Basil S.
Markesinis ed., 2000).
Our aim is to practice law in a new way, which will require a new type of lawyer:
the type that governments, banks and businesses will wish to call upon for advice,
and who will command their respect and friendship, for it is at this level that the
most interesting and demanding legal work will arise.
In order to succeed in this, we will have to be more than a provider of legal ad-
vice: we will have to be able to operate at the highest levels and at the interface
between commerce and government. Our lawyers will have to have broad hori-
zons, beyond a preoccupation with transactions and advice.
Id.
70 Interview #2, at 26. The same lawyer expanded on these comments:
If you compare us with the other law firms alongside accounting firms, we
don't believe in commoditized legal services, by which I mean, we don't
[want] to create a product with people from the tax practice and go out and
sell it as if we're opening a briefcase or a suitcase and selling brushes. We
think there's more to what we do than that. I think it's about creating and
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tween U.K. and U.S. independent law firms, one English lawyer
commented that:
a traditional English law firm would wait until a client rang
them up, would do the document for them, send them the
document, send them the bill and that was it. Whereas, I
think, the U.S. lawyer, the approach is in far different ways
more involved with the clients all the time, is making sug-
gestions, doing this, and... was a slightly more business
orientated approach.7'
The interviewee argues that U.K. firms should adopt the more
business-oriented approach not traditionally identified with British
solicitors. Similarly, the Big Five captive law firm's approach is de-
scribed as more involved in the client's business. The same lawyer
described the distinction:
The way law firms have traditionally worked is to wait for
the client to ring them up and say, "We're doing this deal.
Can you help us with the documentation?" Now, the logic
of hopefully being within an MDP is that you're getting to
the client much earlier, where you are alongside the corpo-
rate finance guys, you're alongside the consulting guys dis-
cussing the deal or putting the deal to the client, so that
when the time comes for it to be documented, you are al-
ready there, as it were.72
The challenge is reflected quite well in the quotation. The challenge,
which the captive law firm hopes to meet, is to be "along side the
corporate finance guys" and the "consulting guys." Otherwise the
lawyer is bound to occupy a subordinate relationship in the transac-
tion.
The importance of this distinction is not lost on talented young
professionals. According to a JD/MBA graduate who was choosing
between law and business, the work at an elite investment bank was
"more challenging and stimulating and more commercial and more
rewarding, and I seemed to get more responsibility quicker than I per-
ceived to get at Cravath .... And I liked the financial side as much as
developing and sustaining relationships with clients; relationships that last
that allow us to be beside the client to understand their business goals and to
work with them to try to realize them and in that context, we obviously
bring industry-specific knowledge.
Id. at 28-29.
71 Interview #I, at 22.
72 Interview #I, at 29.
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the legal side, because it seemed that the financial side was driving
things. 73 The increasing number of successful investment bankers
and consultants who graduated from law school is indicative both of
current competition for talent and the allure of the business settings
where there are opportunities to use the legal expertise that is nearly
always relevant to business decisions. 74
A key to the talent wars is that internationalization and the pres-
sures of global competition have stratified the field of professional
services in business and law. 75 There is an elite sector that commands
the highest fees and recruits the top talent in law and in business. 76 It
is relatively small and depends for its supply of clients on "bet the
company" issues where money is no object. According to a recent
article in The Economist: "The top-tier investment banks have one
talent that still commands huge fees: their brilliance at the life-or-
death deal, such as a hostile takeover, a landmark privatisation or a
public offering., 77 The same is true for the elite law firms and man-
agement consultants, and in order to survive they must recruit the
very top talent. Globalization extends their elite services to clients
from around the world. When they want the best, they come to and
reinforce the power of the leading professional service firms.
In contrast, the Big Five have learned to operate in a much less
elite labor market, and their approach to recruiting reflects those dif-
ferences. Salaries at the Big Five law firms have been less than sev-
enty-five percent of those offered by major international law firms,
and the Big Five accountants lack incomes rivaling those at the lead-
ing investment banks and consulting firms.78 As a result, the Big Five
compete in recruiting by focussing relatively more attention on life-
style and training. The Big Five use quality-of-life issues to compete
for law graduates, for example, by offering more reasonable time
commitments and flexible time options.79 Their captive law firms in
London stress better training to compete with the Magic Circle
firms. 80 For example, a partner with one the Big Five London captive
firms commented:
73 Interview #9, at 2.
74 Interview #9, at 13-15 (describing central role of legal knowledge for purposes of
devising a strategy in particular investment banking activities).
75 See generally Wendy M. Becker et al., Lawyers Get Down to Business, MCKINSEY Q.
No. 2 (2001), at http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2002) (on file with
CWRU Law Review).
76 For JD/MBA graduates, the prospects are easier, since their quantitative skills are taken
for granted. See also Living in Leaner Times, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 4,2001, at 57.
7 Id. at 58.
78 See Garth & Silver, supra note 19, at 20.
79 See id. at 23.
80 Interview #1, at 42-43: "On compensation, we will position ourselves slightly in front
of the U.K. Magic Circle, as it were. That's the intention .... but we won't therefore be com-
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A lot of associates felt that the... traditional law firms...
were delivering technical legal training, but they weren't
really doing anything to develop those associates from a
rounded business perspective so the associates weren't
given access to clients. They weren't allowed to develop
business. They were really just treated as machines, who
were there to process deals.l
A partner at another Big Five captive law firm admitted that:
[W]e won't... be competing with some of the U.S. firms
who are paying New York rates, because I think our propo-
sition is slightly different.... I am amazed at the amount of
money [the firm] spends on training... compared to, say, a
law firm, and if we can plug into the business training, the
soft skills training, as well as provide a good quality legal
environment, that should be attractive.
82
The most elite U.S. law firms traditionally have taken their abil-
ity to attract top talent for granted, although the various salary jumps
suggest an awareness of the increased competition with business enti-
ties. Increased stratification in law has meant that the top talent in law
(as in business) goes to a relatively small number of elite service pro-
viders. It is not distributed in the same way it was a decade or so ago.
Despite the stratification that has taken place in the field of business
and legal advice, including the corporate law firms, however, most
law firms continue to recruit the top law graduates from the top
schools. They then have to settle for the best they can get. However,
the law firms have not adopted the systematic approaches of the Big
Five, whose strategies include recruiting in different places, empha-
sizing lifestyle issues, concentrating on training, and developing
products that their employees can effectively promote.83 The key
peting with some of the U.S. firms who are paying New York rates, because I think our proposi-
tion is slightly different."
81 Interview #2, at 10-11.
82 Interview #1, at42-43.
83 There are exceptions, of course. Certain law firms have broadened their approach to
recruiting in recent years, accepting new graduates from a variety of law schools outside of the
top tier. "As the number and size of large firms [has increased], recruitment has become more
competitive and more meritocratic, leading to changes in the social composition of the new
recruits. The range of law schools from which the big firms recruit has widened, and recruitment
has gone 'deeper' into the class." GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 61, at 53. The key point is
that there are fewer and fewer law firms that can fulfill hiring requirements from the elite law
schools.
Other firms opted out of the 2000 salary wars by highlighting lifestyle benefits rather
than financial compensation. See Mark Schauerte & Nancy Torner, Firms Dig Into Partners'
Pockets As Associates' Salaries Skyrocket, CHICAGO LAw., Apr. 2000, at 8 (listing MeAndrews,
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questions for law firms therefore are whether they can continue to
compete for the very top talent, including luring top students into law
school, and whether they can find ways to work effectively with sec-
ond-tier recruits. If the legal talent pool begins to shrink with a per-
ception that the MBA is more prestigious and better rewarded, then
even fewer law firms will be able to match the talent of Goldman
Sachs and McKinsey and Company.
B. The Challenge of Going Global
The second challenge presented by the entry of MDPs into the
legal services market involves the need to "go global." U.S. law
firms are rooted in a domestic product, U.S. law, and they have been
quite successful in marketing this expertise globally.8 4 There is a
strong sense of pride in U.S. law and legal practice. This approach is
epitomized by firms like Cravath, Swaine & Moore and the small
number of law firms, including Skadden Arps, Wachtell Lipton, Sul-
livan and Cromwell, and Davis, Polk that are beginning to coalesce
into an American "magic circle." For instance, Cravath has served an
international clientele for many years, with "[aipproximately one-
quarter of . . . [its] largest clients . ..based outside the United
States." 5 The firm prides itself on offering consistently high quality
services assured by the uniform training received in the firm's New
York office. Cravath supports two foreign offices, in London and
Hong Kong. All of the partners in these offices are U.S. educated and
licensed. 6 The firm's website reports that that:
Our offices in Hong Kong and London are supervised
by partners with many years of experience in our New York
office and are staffed, in large measure, through associate
rotations from New York. This assures clients that we will
provide the same abilities in mergers and acquisitions, secu-
Held & Malloy and Meckler, Bulger & Tilson as Chicago firms which rejected the increase in
salary in favor of lifestyle. Chicago firms resisting the salary increase included Schiff Hardin &
Waite and D'Ancona & Pflaum).
84 See, e.g., Shearman & Sterling Website, International Transactions, at
http.//www.shearman.com/global/ globalindex.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2001) (on file with
CWRU Law Review).
85 Cravath, Swaine & Moore Website, Our Practice-International, at http//www.cra-
vath.com (last visited Oct. 12,2001) (on file with CWRU Law Review).
86 This was verified through a Martindale-Hubbell search, at http.//www.martindale.com
(last visited Oct. 15, 2001). Martindale-Hubbell did not provide information about associate
lawyers in the foreign offices.
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rities offerings, banking, tax, and project finance at any lo-
cation in the world.87
Other firms take a similar approach. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
for example, affirms the centralized control concept in its website
description:
We were pioneers in expanding law firms and have done so
in a way that both preserves our culture and assures our cli-
ents of high quality, cost-effective services. We opened and
expanded new offices without merging or acquiring another
firm; rather, we relocated "home-grown" lawyers and care-
fully screened and selected prominent individuals to join our
new offices and practice groups in each community.88
The traditional structures of these law firms promote a domestic
emphasis. The governing partnership is typically centered in a major
U.S. city, especially New York for the most elite firms, 89 and the
partners quite logically expect new partners to "make it" in New York
and to possess the same mix of talent and personal characteristics of
the existing partners. This structure has made it difficult for persons
of different backgrounds and profiles to make partner, including mi-
norities and women. For present purposes it is important to note that
it is quite difficult for a non-U.S. national who is not thoroughly
Americanized to gain acceptance at the law firms. In contrast, the in-
vestment banks and the business consulting companies, perhaps be-
cause the required expertise is not domestically focused, appear far
more accepting of non-U.S. nationals. For example, Raj Gupta, from
India, has been the head of McKinsey and Company for a number of
87 Cravath, Swaine & Moore Website, supra note 85. See also Richard Tyler, A Blip on
Wall Street's Radar, THE LAWYER, Dec. 1, 1998, at 19-20. (noting that Cravath believes that its
"strength is that everyone is home-grown"). Cleary Gottlieb also stresses uniform training in its
firm brochure: "For more than 40 years, the firm's legal staff has included European lawyers,
most of whom received a part of their academic training in the United States and many of whom
completed traineeships in one of the firm's U.S. offices." Cleary Gottlieb, Firm Brochure (n.d.)
(on file with author).
88 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Website, The Firm, at
http.//www.gibsondunn.com/About.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (on file with CWRU Law
Review). Simpson Thacher offers another example in its firm brochure: "In each of these prac-
tice areas the firm conducts a New York quality practice enabling young professionals to master
their development regardless of location." Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, Firm Brochure 8 (1999)
(on file with author). Sullivan & Cromwell departed from its previous New York focused pol-
icy by offering partnerships to laterally hired German lawyers. See Legal Media Group, Sulli-
van Snares Second German Partner in a Week, at http://www.legalmediagroup.com (last visited
Oct. 22,2001) (on file with CWRU Law Review).
89 California based firms, such as Latham & Watkins and Brobeck, were temporarily
among the international elite during the high-tech boom. As the boom turned into a bust, these
firms lost status on the international legal hierarchy. See Renee Deger, MY. Firms Seek Valley
Niche, RECORDER, Sept. 16, 1999, at 1.
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years. These entities competing for the very top talent appear better
equipped than even the elite law firms to draw on individuals from
outside the U.S. The resulting diversification helps these entities to
attract the cutting-edge deals from around the world and to assume a
central role in developing the strategy and marshaling needed exper-
tise for the deals.
The pressures of globalization become even more serious for
smaller, traditionally structured U.S. law firms. Major challenges are
to obtain expertise in domestic and transnational law, as well as in
local legal expertise in various countries, and to maintain uniform
quality and a consistent advising approach in the process. In this re-
spect, the Big Five captive law firms have successfully "gone global"
by making better use of foreign talent than have U.S. law firms.
Law firms have followed one of two approaches to going global.
The first approach is the "home office approach" which involves
sending a U.S. partner overseas to establish a presence, and then peri-
odically rotating U.S. lawyers from the home office through the for-
eign office. 9° Firms using this approach identify themselves as nation-
ally-based with a home office that exercises control in management
and sets the standard of quality for domestic and foreign offices. This
approach was aptly described by one Big Five captive firm lawyer as
"the sort of imperialist approach and this is how you do it and this is
head office, etc." 91
The second approach to going global capitalizes on foreign law-
yers and makes their expertise in foreign law central to their identi-
ties. The model for this approach might be Baker & McKenzie, with
offices in more than thirty jurisdictions, staffed primarily with law-
yers licensed in the foreign locations. A variation on this model en-
courages mixing among lawyers, regardless of the place where they
were licensed and educated. White & Case is one. example; a White
& Case partner described his firm's approach to moving lawyers
among offices as having the goal of a "tossed salad." Clifford Chance
operates on a similar system, and many of its lawyers work outside of
the countries where they were educated and originally licensed.
90 Firms have abandoned this narrow U.S. focus in the last few years. The growth of
foreign offices has made relying on U.S. home office lawyers to satisfy staffing needs nearly
impossible. Foreign regulation of the scope of practice permitted to U.S. lawyers also has been
liberalized in many countries, allowing U.S. firms to offer both U.S. and local legal expertise in
several strategic locations around the world. This regulatory change has encouraged many U.S.
law firms to hire local lawyers, who often serve alongside U.S. lawyers, for their foreign offices.
See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Who's Going Global, AM. LAW., Nov. 2000, at 78. Nevertheless, the
managers of these firms are U.S. lawyers who have never worked in a foreign office. In many
of these firms, domestic law and lawyers predominate over foreign activities. An overwhelming
number of their lawyers are American-born experts in U.S. law.
91 Interview #3, at 35.
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One of the crucial differences between the two approaches re-
lates to the value placed upon an international assignment. Firms that
follow the first approach to internationalization downplay the rele-
vance of a foreign assignment to a lawyer's promotion and position
within the firm. Rather, these firms tend to stick closely to the bill-
able hour reward system, and discount international work experience
unless it enriches a lawyer in terms of billing responsibility.92 Firms
following the second approach, however, tend to see a foreign experi-
ence as important in terms of promotion. This difference in attitude is
evident in the comments of a partner of one of the Big Five captive
law firms in London: "English law firms ... regard sending someone
to their foreign office as a good thing. If you get sent to Hong Kong,
it's a positive step in your career [but] ... in the States... if you're
sent away from the head office, that's a bad thing, because you're out
of the eyesight of the senior partners and their guys." 93 In contrast,
one of the leaders of Clifford Chance was elected because of the qual-
ity of his management of an office in the Soviet Union.
94
The Big Five have set the standard in their auditing practices for
international coverage. They have more offices in more countries
than any law firm, and these offices are often staffed by individuals
from the location of the offices rather than by home-office personnel.
The Big Five are masters at managing global networks of firms, and
hiring and retaining personnel from many different countries.
They have followed a similar approach to globalization in build-
ing their captive law firms.95 Their expansion into new national legal
markets at the same time that U.S. and U.K. firms are expanding in-
ternationally has occasionally resulted in competition among the tra-
ditional law firms and the Big Five firms for legal talent and in some
92 A recent article noted that Davis Polk had only recently promoted a lawyer stationed in
London to partnership. See Frankel, supra note 90, at 82. ("It used to be that associates had
little chance of making partner if they didn't spend a good part of their careers in the U.S. Then,
in 1999, John Banes, an American associate who had worked in the firm's London outpost since
1994, made partner; and this year Chinese American associate Show-Mao Chen was named a
partner in the Hong Kong office, where he'd been since 1993.").
93 Interview #1, at 12-13.
94 See Interview #1, at 18-19. See also Clark, supra note 69, at 7 (commenting on the
"Clifford Chance vision" of "lawyers who ... will be ... born in one part of the world, educated
in another, living and working in another, at home in several languages and cultures").
" Andersen Legal reports that it has offices in 36 countries. See Anderson Legal Website,
About Us, at http:llwww.andersenlegal.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (on file at CWRU Law
Review). Klegal lists 29 countries as locations for its services, although in certain of these
locations, such as Mexico, legal services are offered through KPMG's legal department rather
than through a separate organization. See KLegal Website, Country Selector, at
http://www.klegal.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (on file with CWRU Law Review). Land-
well supports lawyers in 40 countries. See Landwell Website, Homepage, at
http://www.landwellglobal.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (on file with CwRU Law Review).
EY Law Services offers legal services in more than 60 countries. See Ernst & Young Website,
About E&Y, at http://www.ey.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (on file at CWRU Law Review).
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cases for foreign law firms. This has often caused firms in a particu-
lar country to commit to one avenue of international expansion or
another and has substantially altered the legal community.96
These different approaches to globalization result in different at-
titudes and opportunities for foreign lawyers. The second approach,
followed by the Big Five law firms among others, relies on foreign
lawyers for so much of the practice that it is essential for them to feel
a part of the firm, on equal footing with their Anglo-American col-
leagues. 97 Promotion within the firm reflects the attitude of support-
ing diverse legal specialties. The first approach to globalization,
however, maintains a home country identity that privileges lawyers
trained in the law of the firm's home country, and excludes foreign
lawyers. A U.K. lawyer who now works for one of the Big Five cap-
tive firms articulated this U.S. bias very clearly in relaying a conver-
sation with the managing partner of a U.S. law firm. The U.S. lawyer
reported about problems in the firm's Hong Kong office: "One, they
had some very, very good Hong Kong attorneys, lawyers, but they
hadn't worked in New York, which seemed to be some capital of-
fense as far as his firm was concerned...." 98
While it is easy to see that openness to diverse legal training is
essential to building a firm with foreign offices staffed by local law-
yers, there are problems inherent in this approach that are unique to
law. Law is its own language, and the approach to providing legal
services varies considerably from one country to another. In contrast,
"numbers are numbers," 99 and'numbers are the language of account-
ing and certain other professional services. What "going global"
means to the accounting profession is something that law, by its very
nature, makes problematic. The various differences in local law are
96 Singapore's legal community has undergone just such a sea change in the last few
years. The local legal market was isolated from international law firms until recently, because
regulations prohibited Singaporean lawyers from practicing local law in combination with a
foreign law firm. The first change to affect the market was the affiliation of one of the largest
local firms, Rajah & Tann, with Arthur Andersen in 1999. Subsequently, the Attorney General
issued new rules permitting a limited number of formal affiliations between foreign and Singa-
porean law firms. This new regulation resulted in the affiliation of at least eight local firms with
elite U.K. and U.S. law firms, as well as informal affiliations among a number of additional
local and U.K. and U.S. law firms. See The Law Society of Singapore (Joint Law Ventures), at
http://www.lawsociety.org.sg (last visited Feb. 13, 2000); Nick Ferguson, Jury Still Out on
Singapore Joint Ventures, INT'L FIN. L. REV. (Sept. 2001), at
http://www.legalmediagroup.com/IFLR/defaulLasp?Page=1 &cIndex=3&SID=3055&M=9&Y=
2001 (on file CWRU Law Review).
97 The Big Five legal networks are not U.S.-centered because they cannot operate in the
U.S. to any significant degree yet. The leadership comes from England, France and Spain.
98 Interview #3, at 12-13.
99 See So You Want to Make a Deal, CoRp. LEGAL TIMEs, Sept. 1999, at 28, 29. "Num-




reinforced by licensing barriers, education requirements, language,
and the particular national approach to law and legal services. These
various factors make it nearly impossible to offer one kind of legal
service from various locations using local lawyers with expertise in
local law.
Yet without going global in this sense, U.S. firms risk appearing
both parochial and patronizing. The challenge for U.S. law firms is to
incorporate and envelop the foreign law and lawyers rather than sim-
ply control them. Globalization challenges law firms to be more open
and international, and at the same time less imperialistic. In the
global competition to provide professional services, which includes
such tasks as setting up a business and making initial introductions,
handling human relations issues, and meeting environmental require-
ments, the truly international firm, whether accounting-based or law-
based, may have tremendous advantages. Such a firm presents a very
strong challenge to U.S.-based law firms and the U.S. legal profes-
sion. That does not mean that all law firms must go global in this
sense in order to succeed, but it means once again that the competitive
pressures of globalization-all other things being equal-favor the
firms that can operate successfully from many local bases.
C. Challenging the Billable Hour
The third challenge posed by MDPs relates to the reliance on
billable hours as the method of rewarding lawyers within law firms
and regulating relationships with clients. The billable hour works well
for partners as long as things are going well, but it also tends to dis-
courage any reform that jeopardizes the number of hours that associ-
ates work to hold up partner profits. As a result, for example, when
firms raise associates' pay in response to competition from business,
the natural response of the partners is to demand more hours from
associates. 1° The businesses, in contrast, look for other ways to cover
10o This is exactly what occurred during the 2000 salary wars, when billable hour expecta-
tions were raised to an annual expectation of 2400 hours. See, e.g., Kristin Choo, The Right
Equation: Despite Increasing Numbers of Female Lawyers, Gender Equality May Not Be Guar-
anteed in the Future, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2001, at 60. (noting that "increased senior associate and
partner salaries, which in turn triggered firms' demands for more billable hours to cover the
increases"); David Kuhlman & Robert Dicks, Associate Pay: Challenging Conventional Wis-
dom Three Ways, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 6, 2001, at 5-6. The article notes:
Many firms, for example, have historically offered a compelling work/life
balance to their associates, asking for billable hours in the 1,650 to 1,700 range.
Yet, many of these same firms who have hastily jumped into the pay frenzy are
now requiring their associates to bill between 2,000-2,500 hours a year....
These firms do not recognize that by seeing this as a pay problem alone, they
are violating a primary reason their associates chose to join the firm.
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those additional costs. The billable hour system more generally limits
the ability of law firms to go beyond traditional roles, and discourages
the firms from utilizing business-oriented approaches such as organiz-
ing horizontal rather than hierarchical working groups, researching
the development of new services and approaches, and developing
lifestyle options for recruiting.
As the pressure increases on law firms to keep prices down and
commodify legal services, law firms must develop the ability to gen-
erate new ways to serve businesses. They must be willing to fund the
development of these ideas. The law firm billable hour has been so
profitable to law firms for so long that it has been far more difficult to
abandon the approach than it has for the accounting firms or the busi-
ness consultants. In contrast, the business-line development people at
the Big Five are not required to bill the hours spent on development,
but instead are rewarded and subsidized for generating ideas for new
products.
The billable hour system has been challenged increasingly in
recent years. It has been identified as responsible for many of the
problems of the legal profession. According to a recent article about
life in a large U.S. law firm: "Hours-and-billing talk was the one
thing that brought everyone together.... we heard the drumbeat of
budgeted hours; of annualized hours and targeted hours; of average,
median, and projected hours. Latham and its competitors make time
into a fetish and attorneys into production units."10 1 The new presi-
dent of the ABA, Robert Hirshon, has identified the billable hour sys-
tem as tyrannical:
"They can't do it forever. They can do it maybe for a
year or two years," he said of that frenzied work pace. "If
you bill those hours, you don't have time for pro bono, you
don't have time for the bar association, you don't have time
for life. And that is what is happening."
The ABA recently did a study that showed lawyers
who had been in practice for three to four years are "leaving
the practice at an alarming rate," Hirshon reported. "Those
lawyers were telling us if this is what it was all about, they
were gone."
Id.; Lisa M. Whitley, Billing Rate Increases Almost Double, TEX. LAW., May 28, 2001, at 35
("We paid for [billing rate hikes] with higher associate hours where we had some associates
working below averages ... We came up with more uniform billable hours requirements.")
(quoting a Thompson & Knight managing partner).101 Ross Guberman, Running from the Law, WASHINGTONIAN, Oct. 2001, at 51.
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"I think we've got the billable hour tail wagging the
dog. We work under a tyranny of billable hours. We've got
to create a different dynamic."
10
The problem is that it is not easy to give up a system that has worked
well for a long time for many partners. In a world of increased com-
petition for the top talent between business and law on the one
hand, 10 3 and of the need for teamwork and innovation on the other,
the law firm billable hour begins to look as anachronistic as it does
for the other professional service firms.
D. The Disciplinary Challenge
The fourth and fifth challenges relate directly to the third one.
Again the concern is less with the most elite law firms, which require
a talent that moves outside of the disciplinary boundaries, than with
the rank and file practitioners of corporate law who are increasingly
squeezed by corporate counsel and fee pressures to commoditize legal
services. The pressures can come from specific bargaining about a
standard service for a price. One of the key members of the general
counsel's office at Cisco, for example, spoke about the office's ability
to use its in-house legal staff for small mergers and acquisitions, ena-
bling them to keep the expenses of outside law firms to an absolute
minimum. The pressure also can come from corporations utilizing
outside law firms for small substantive niches, thus allowing outside
firms to participate only in a narrow and technical part of a transac-
tion.104
Just as insurance defense has become unprofitable for corporate
law firms, 105 other services can be subject to competitive bidding and
downward pricing pressure. These competitive pressures, we have
noted, come with the increased business competition of globalization
and open markets, and they have led the Big Five to try to expand
102 Gary Blankenship, Profession Is Facing a "Public Interest Squeeze," FLA. B. NEWS,
Sept. 15,2001, at7.
103 Again the most elite law firms may be able to survive longer and continue attracting top
talent in part because law is less risky than business, a phenomenon more noticeable in a down-
turn than during an economic boom.
104 A description by a Big Five tax partner regarding the relationship between clients and
various kinds of professional service firms is relevant: "[Trhe investment banks would ...
select their clients or their targets and they would do 1, 2, 3 deals and then move on to some-
thing else, because they wanted to keep those things low-profile. The accounting firms took this
to different levels, mass market. And again, the law firms would have a role in being asked to
check the legality on all these ideas. And this is where we are today." Interview #7, at 24.
1o5 See, e.g., Ward Bower, Law Firm Economics and Professionalism, 100 DICK. L. REV.
515, 520 (1996); John P. Killacky, Note, Expanding the Tripartite Relationship: Extending
Evidentiary Privilege to Fourth-Party Legal Audits, 2000 U. ILL L. REv. 1339, 1340 (2000);
Lisa Brennan, Insurance Defense Lawyers Switch Fields in Droves, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., May 19, 1998, at 1.
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their connections through the audit into a range of related services
that can generate more profit. One Big Five tax lawyer emphasized
this team approach to pitching work and providing services:
where it starts differing from the law firm is that the matrix
in an accounting firm ... is that if you practice alone, you
will never be able, unless you have a huge leverage with a
lot of associates and managers working for you - you will
never be able to meet your revenue goals. You have to work
with other partners, you have to be in teams, because you
have to be able to service clients who need employee bene-
fit expertise, who need international expertise, who need
M&A expertise. Clients need a broad range of expertise.
And as a partner here, you are rewarded more if you work
with teams of other partners who have... different special-
ties, than if you work all by yourself.1°6
This approach represents a departure from the traditional law firm
method of approaching clients, which is aimed more particularly at
providing the specific legal services for a transaction or dispute. This
more entrepreneurial approach seeks the cross selling of expertise in
order to allow the firm to deepen the relationship with the client. The
restrictions imposed increasingly upon lawyers by their in-house cli-
ents increase the pressure on U.S. law firms to expand their traditional
offerings to clients. Here, too, the billable hour system and the tradi-
tion of rewarding individual lawyers according to the hours generated
by them and performed by their subordinates provides little incentive
for combining with other disciplines. By resisting this move to offer
various disciplinary approaches, however, the opportunities for law
firms to compete in the field of legal and business advice are greatly
restricted. The same hypothetical posed in the previous section is
again relevant: if a company plans to set up an office or initiate busi-
ness activities in a foreign country, the question is whether a firm ca-
pable of offering the expertise of a variety of disciplines will have
relevant advantages in a very competitive market.
E. Individualization
The remaining challenge, again closely related, is the individual-
ized system of the traditional law firms, where the incentives focus on
individual lawyers building relationships with clients and with teams
of associates. The incentives for lawyers to promote referrals to oth-
ers within their firm, for example, are weak unless those others pose
'06 Interview #7, at 48.
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no threat to the referring lawyers. Jealousies over client preferences
and loyalties for particular lawyers reinforce the individualized struc-
ture. Part of the individualization is the tendency for leading lawyers
to seek to become "stars" in terms of their clients and their media at-
tention. These stars can easily leave the firm for greener pastures and
take clients with them.
It is interesting to note that neither the Big Five, Goldman Sachs,
nor McKinsey and Company promote the idea of individual stars.
Indeed, it is discouraged in the interests of firm identity and firm-
generated products and services. Similarly, people are encouraged to
identify themselves above all with the particular elite company, and
not with their individual academic disciplines or training. This his-
torical individualization inhibits law firms from competing at all lev-
els, in the same manner as the law firm billable hour and the concen-
tration of law firms on law hampers competition. The question we
raise in this section, in short, is whether the star system is ultimately
inconsistent with the long-term success of law firms in an increas-
ingly competitive and stratified global market. Brand names may be
more important than star status within the legal profession.
CONCLUSION
The competition that comes with globalization is creating pres-
sures that have helped to generate the so-called MDPs, and globaliza-
tion has helped to produce new hybrid entities capable of responding
through new organizational forms. There is a blurring of boundaries
even at the most elite level of business advice, with investment banks
and management consultants hiring lawyers for non-legal roles and
competing to be the dominant actors in high stakes global business
transactions. These stealth MDPs compete for talent among them-
selves and compete on behalf of business education with law for the
status of leading expertise. It is probably fair to say that the invest-
ment banks and management consultants have gained at the expense
of elite corporate law firms in recent years, but a recession typically
provides some advantage to law firms in this competition. The ques-
tion here is less about whether to permit MDPs or not, since law firms
can hire other professionals and compensate them at whatever level
they deem appropriate. But we have argued that the traditional institu-
tional structure of the law firm imposes some obstacles to competing
at this very high level.
Still, the top law firms are thriving in the global environment. In
a panel last April at the Yale Law School on issues related to large
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law fimis, 1° 7 the managing partners of Cravath, Swaine & Moore and
Sullivan & Cromwell both opined that they saw no crisis at all in this
new era of globalization and global competition. They noted, how-
ever, that businesses no longer seemed to rely on outside counsel as
trusted business advisors, instead using them for specific transactions
or litigation, but even these roles as part of "bet the company" trans-
actions were sufficient to keep the partners at these firms fully em-
ployed at premium rates. The scarcity of elite law firms has enabled
them to thrive even if their relative position in the hierarchy of busi-
ness advice may have declined.
The Cravath model, however, is also the model that shapes re-
cruitment, promotion, billing, and the services offered by virtually all
large corporate law firms, including those that cannot compete for the
largest deals. To some extent it is a matter of degree: there is not a
fixed line between elites and rank and file, which plays out also in
local settings, but globalization makes this model look almost anach-
ronistic.
The Big Five, with far fewer resources in talent and prestige than
the corporate law firms, have thus far survived commodification un-
der the supervision of the CFOs at the major corporations and thrived
in the global environment. They have learned to cross-sell services,
reward the creation of new products, and to make themselves at the
same time indigenous and transnational in almost all the countries of
the world. Their move into legal services is part of the same trajec-
tory, although for a variety of reasons the result is less a real MDP
than a formalization of closely related relationships between audit,
tax, and law firms. They are not at the top of the professional services
firm hierarchy, and the Enron scandal will only serve to "put them in
their place" more securely, but they have adapted to their role in the
hierarchy, the limits of the talent available to them, the places where
they can pursue profits, and globalization.
Corporate law firms now face similar challenges to find ways to
avoid being squeezed through commodification on one side and the
provision of related business-law services (e.g., human resources, liti-
gation support, environmental compliance, corruption compliance,
compliance with corporate codes of conduct, and tax) on the other,
which can be provided by a wide range of "MDPs" already. We have
listed these challenges to the traditional model that accompany glob-
alization.
1o7 The panel was part of a symposium held at Yale Law School on April 28, 2001, cele-
brating the University's tercentenary.
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Law firms are already beginning to mimic the Big Five by mov-
ing into cross-selling other services.108 Just as in the Big Five, where
there has been a generational struggle between the more traditional
auditors and those who felt they had to change to compete, 109 there is
strong resistance by those who believe that the core values are threat-
ened by any combination or broadening of disciplines. As we have
noted elsewhere, 110 the legal profession in the U.S. has fought every
step of the way toward business control over individual legal services.
The examples include insurance defense and even the development of
inside counsel. These issues have receded, leaving the issue of "con-
trol" by non-lawyers over law firms. When the choice threatens to
estrange lawyers from business developments, the balance of profes-
sional power has always gone with change. That result is not inevita-
ble, and the U.S. influence may keep the Big Five's law firms in a
relatively weak global position. However, if the legal profession
chooses to ban these arrangements entirely, it will lose opportunities
to bolster the profession's role as a global business advisor. Such a
step might even eventually confine legal practice to local litigation,
priced as a kind of commodity. Needless to say, talent may not flow
into such a profession.
In any event, the pressures of globalization have to date pro-
duced a compromise position that would allow a lawyer-controlled
MDP offering legal services and other business services."' Our ques-
tion is whether this formal arrangement represents the preservation of
core values or simply an accommodation that provides only symbolic
103 Crystal Nix Hines, Competition Sprouts One-Stop Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2001, at Cl. (reporting on cross-selling law firm businesses, and Boston's Bingham Dana's
movement into ancillary businesses following the Big Five). According to Bingham Dana's
managing partner. "The accounting firms 'took their two main assets-reputation and client
base--and leveraged them by looking at the needs and effectively cross-selling, creating a
whole line of businesses which became very lucrative' .... Law firms... 'have the same as-
sets,' and can likewise provide 'a combined, integrated approach."' Id.; Leslie Wayne, Trading
on Their Names; Turning Government Experience into Corporate Advice, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2001, at Cl'(reporting on the activities of the Cohen Group in "international strategic consult-
ing;" following the lead of the Carlyle Group and its senior advisor, former president George
Bush, and Kissinger McLarty and Associates).
109 Brent Shearer, Dealing With the Rifts at Accounting Firms, MERGERS AND ACQUISI-
TIONS J., May 1,2002, at I. "[Tihe new guard is pushing the theory that perhaps you can build
in enough safeguards so that the prohibition between the two kinds of work [audit and consult-
ing] need not be absolute. The old guard believes no wall is strong enough to prevent absolute
conflict or the perception of potential conflict." Id.
11 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 5, at 513.
" The new New York MDP rules are explicit on this issue, providing that law firms may
also offer nonlegal services provided that "[tihe lawyer or law firm neither grants to the nonle-
gal professional or nonlegal professional service firm, nor permits such person or firm to obtain,
hold or exercise, directly or indirectly, any ownership or investment interest in, or managerial or
supervisory right, power or position in connection with the practice of law by the lawyer or law
firm ... " N.Y. APP. DIV. CT. R. § 1200.05-c(a)(2) (McKinney 2002) (adding N.Y. CODE OF
PROF'L REsPONSIBILrrY DR 1-107), available at http://www.nysba.org/opinions/mdprules.html.
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reassurance. In fact, the legal profession, given its need to compete, to
respond to the competition for talent, and to promote efficiencies and
a stream of new products, will likely stretch the boundaries of those
values once more in order to accommodate business' demand for le-
gal services.
